* Center Square…

Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul said a lawsuit challenging the Illinois Gun Dealer License Certification Act is “not ripe for judicial review” and should be dismissed because state police have yet to fully implement the act and that no part of the law has been used to stop dealers from doing business.

The attorney general responded Monday to a lawsuit in Sangamon County Circuit Court filed by several gun stores across the state and the Illinois State Rifle Association. […]

Some dealers don’t want to invest the $300 to $1,500 per business operating name to apply and comply with the new state mandates required on top of what’s required to get the federal firearms dealer license.

“[Gun dealers] may spend $20,000 on a security system for example and it might not work [for the state mandate] so they have to go spend another $20,000,” Pearson said.

* From the AG’s motion to dismiss…

After a licensee submits the required materials to the State Police for certification of the federal firearms license, the State Police issues an “initial certificate of license within 30 days.” “If the [State Police] does not issue the certificate within 30 days, the licensee shall operate as if a certificate has been granted unless and until a denial is issued by the” State Police. Dealing in firearms without a certified license is a crime, and also can subject the firearms dealer to administrative sanctions. Not one of the plaintiff firearms dealers alleges that it has been subjected to any sanctions, or that the State Police has denied or prevented it from obtaining a certificate. A certification of license is valid for the term of the federal firearms license being certified.

* About those security systems…

Plaintiffs challenge section 5-50 of the Act, 430 ILCS 68/5-50, which describes the type of security system that a certified licensee must have for a retail location. That section states that, by no later than January 2, 2021, “[e]ach certified licensee operating a retail location in this State must maintain a video security system and shall maintain video surveillance of critical areas of the business premises, including, but not limited to, all places where firearms in inventory are stored, handled, sold, or transferred, and each entrance and exit.” 460 ILCS 68/5-50(a). Also, “[i]f a video security system is deemed inadequate by the [State Police], the licensee shall have 30 days to correct the inadequacy. The [State Police] shall submit to the licensee a written statement describing the specific inadequacies.”

* Excerpts from the Second Amendment argument…

In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008), the United States Supreme Court confirmed that “conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms” are “presumptively lawful” under the Second Amendment. And in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010), the Court said, “[w]e made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as . . . laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. We repeat those assurances here.”

The presumption of validity of regulatory burdens on the sale of firearms is not surprising, for the Second Amendment’s “central component is the right to possess firearms for protection.” Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 699 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). Nothing in the Complaint alleges that the Act imposes an undue burden on a citizen’s right to possess a firearm—at least, not to the extent that the Second Amendment would be concerned. Where a restriction on firearms is presumptively valid, as Heller and McDonald say is the case for regulations concerning the sale of firearms, the Second Amendment does not apply. See Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 690 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Second Amendment does not independently protect a proprietor’s right to sell firearms.”), certiorari denied, 138 S. Ct. 1988; United States v. Chafin, 423 Fed. Appx. 342, 344 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Indeed, although the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms, it does not necessarily give rise to a corresponding right to sell a firearm.”).

* On the challenge to the fees…

To the extent Count II includes a vagueness challenge to the Act’s fee provision, 430 ILCS 68/5-70, the claim should be dismissed under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure for failure to allege any facts suggesting that the fee provision is unconstitutionally vague.

* Ripeness…

Thus, as in Conlon, plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge is not ripe because it is possible that the rulemaking process will clarify the terms that plaintiffs claim to be vague, and will moot their vagueness challenge.

Moreover, the Complaint nowhere alleges any facts showing that defendants have enforced any of the challenged provisions against any of the plaintiff firearms dealers. […]

In Count III, Plaintiffs allege that the State Police is enforcing sections 5-30, 5-55, and 5- 60 of the Act without the promulgation of administrative rules. (Ex. B, Compl., ¶¶44–52.) But as noted above, the rulemaking process is underway and, in the meantime, the Complaint does not allege that the State Police has enforced any of the provisions against any plaintiff.

The AG also maintains that the ISRA lacks standing.