* Let’s take a look at ComEd’s deferred prosecution agreement, starting with this section entitled “Hiring of Public Official A’s [Speaker Madigan’s] Associates as Vendor ‘Subcontractors’ Who Performed Little or No Work for ComEd”…

Beginning no later than in or around 2011, Public Official A and Individual A sought to obtain from ComEd jobs, vendor subcontracts, and monetary payments associated with those jobs and subcontracts for various associates of Public Official A, such as precinct captains who operated within Public Official A’s legislative district.

In or around 2011, Individual A and Lobbyist 1 developed a plan to direct money to two of Public Official A’s associates (“Associate 1” and “Associate 2”) by having ComEd pay them indirectly as subcontractors to Consultant 1. Payments to Associate 1 and Associate 2, as well as later payments to other subcontracted associates of Public Official A, continued until in or around 2019, even though those associates did little or no work during that period.

Consultant 1 agreed in 2011 that Public Official A’s associates would be identified as subcontractors under Consultant 1’s contract and that ComEd’s payments to Consultant 1 would be increased to cover payments to those subcontractors. Between in or around 2011 and 2019, Consultant 1 executed written contracts and submitted invoices to ComEd that made it falsely appear that the payments made to Company 1 were all in return for Consultant 1’s advice on “legislative issues” and “legislative risk management activities,” and other similar matters, when in fact a portion of the compensation paid to Company 1 was intended for ultimate payment to Public Official A’s associates, who in fact did little or no work for ComEd. Consultant 1 and Company 1 did little, if anything, to direct or supervise the activities of Public Official A’s associates, even though they were subcontracted under and received payments through Company 1. Moreover, because they were paid indirectly through Company 1, the payments to Public Official A’s associates over the course of approximately eight years were not reflected in the vendor payment system used by ComEd, and as a result, despite that Public Official A’s associates were subcontracted under and receiving payments through Company 1, no such payments were identifiable in ComEd’s vendor payment system.

Certain senior executives and agents of ComEd were aware of these payments from their inception until they were discontinued in or around 2019. For example, in or around May 2018, Public Official A, through Individual A, asked CEO-1 to hire a political ally of Public Official A who was retiring from the Chicago City Council at the end of the month (“Associate 3”).

Public Official A, we know, is Speaker Madigan. The alderman who retired in 2018 was likely Michael Zalewski. Could “Consultant 1″ be this guy?…

For example, the previously unreported records show ComEd paid Jay D. Doherty and Associates $3,104,250 between 2011 and 2018. That amount is almost six times greater than the roughly $530,000 he disclosed being paid by ComEd in lobbyist disclosures filed with the city of Chicago. In federal filings, ComEd vaguely listed Doherty’s work only as “business consulting.” […]

WBEZ has reported that investigators are looking into whether Doherty served as a “pass through” for ComEd’s under-the-radar deals with politically connected individuals and companies, some of whom are suspected of doing little or no work.

* Those alleged pass-through payments to Consultant 1 explained…

Certain senior executives and agents of ComEd were also aware of the purpose of these payments to Public Official A’s associates, namely, that they were intended to influence and reward Public Official A in connection with Public Official A’s official duties and to advance ComEd’s business interests.

The feds don’t come right out and say it, but they’re all but alleging bribery here.

* “Individual A” looks to my eyes to be Mike McClain…

On or about May 16, 2018, Individual A explained to Senior Executive 1 why certain individuals were being paid indirectly through Company 1, by making reference to their utility to Public Official A’s political operation. Individual A identified Associate 1, one of the several individuals on Company 1’s payroll, as “one of the top three precinct captains” who also “trains people how to go door to door . . . so just to give you an idea how important the guy is.” […]

On or about February 11, 2019, Individual A had a conversation with Lobbyist 1, who by that time had retired from ComEd, but had continued to serve as a paid external lobbyist to ComEd. In discussing how the renewal of Company 1’s contract—which included significant payments to Company 1 to account for indirect payments to Public Official A’s associates—should be communicated internally, Individual A said, “We had to hire these guys because [Public Official A] came to us. It’s just that simple.” Lobbyist 1 agreed, and added, “It’s, it’s clean for all of us.”

Lobbyist 1, in my opinion, looks like John Hooker.

* Here’s where the alleged quid pro quo comes in…

Consultant 1 emphasized that he had told no one of the arrangement per instructions previously given to Consultant 1, and cautioned Senior Executive 1 that ComEd should not tamper with the arrangement because “your money comes from Springfield,” and that Consultant 1 had “every reason to believe” that Individual A had spoken to Public Official A about the retention of Public Official A’s associates, and knew Lobbyist 1 had done so Consultant 1 added that Public Official A’s associates “keep their mouth shut, and, you know, so. But, do they do anything for me on a day to day basis? No.” Consultant 1 explained that these payments were made “to keep [Public Official A] happy, I think it’s worth it, because you’d hear otherwise.”

* More…

On or about March 5, 2019, Individual A and ComEd personnel participated in a meeting during which they discussed Company 1’s contract and why the indirect payments to Public Official A’s associates made under the guise of that contract should be continued for another year. During that meeting, Individual A explained that for decades, Public Official A had named individuals to be ComEd employees, such as meter readers, as part of an “old-fashioned patronage system.” In response, a ComEd employee acknowledged that such hires could be a “chip” used by ComEd. ComEd renewed Company 1’s contract.

* We know that the feds were listening to McClain’s phone calls. This looks like an example…

On or about March 6, 2019, Individual A and Lobbyist 1 discussed the renewal of Company 1’s contract. During the conversation, Lobbyist 1 explained that “with the [Consultant 1] stuff, you got a little leg up,” to which Individual A agreed. Lobbyist 1 later added, “I mean it’s uh, unmentioned, but you know, that which is understood need not be mentioned.” Individual A responded, “Right. Exactly. Exactly.”

* From the section entitled “Appointment of Board Member 1 as Member of the Board of Directors at the Request of Public Official A”…

Beginning in or around 2017, Public Official A sought the appointment of an associate to the ComEd Board of Directors (hereinafter referred to as “Board Member 1”). Public Official A’s request was communicated by Individual A to CEO-1. In or around May 2018, in response to internal company opposition to the appointment of Board Member 1, CEO-1 asked Individual A if Public Official A would be satisfied if CEO-1 arranged for Board Member 1 to receive a part-time job that paid an equivalent amount of money to a board member position, namely, $78,000 a year. Individual A told CEO-1 that Public Official A would appreciate if CEO-1 would “keep pressing” for the appointment of Board Member 1, and CEO-1 agreed to do so. In or around September 2018, CEO-1 (who by this time had been promoted to an executive position within Exelon Utilities, in which capacity CEO-1 maintained oversight authority over ComEd) assured Individual A that CEO-1 was continuing to advocate for the appointment of Board Member 1 made at Public Official A’s request because “You take good care of me and so does our friend [Public Official A] and I will do the best that I can to, to take care of you.”

On or about April 25, 2019, CEO-1 advised Individual A by text message, “Just sent out Board approval to appoint [Board Member 1] to ComEd Board.” The following day, April 26, 2019, ComEd filed a notice with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission stating that Board Member 1 had served as a director of ComEd since April 2019. Although ComEd and Exelon conducted due diligence on Board Member 1 and ultimately determined he was qualified for a Board position, no one at ComEd or Exelon recruited Board Member 1 to serve as a director, and ComEd did not interview or vet other outside candidates for the vacant board seat. ComEd appointed Board Member 1, in part, with the intent to influence and reward Public Official A in connection with Public Official A’s official duties.

Whoa. Legal or not, that’s brazen.

…Adding… From an SEC filing under “Election of Directors”…

Juan Ochoa, Age 48. Mr. Ochoa has served as a Director of ComEd since April 2019.

* “Retention of Law Firm A”…

In or around 2011, ComEd agreed to retain Law Firm A, and entered into a contract pursuant to which ComEd agreed to provide Law Firm A with a minimum of 850 hours of attorney work per year. This contract was entered into with Law Firm A, in part, with the intent to influence and reward Public Official A in connection with Public Official A’s official duties and because personnel and agents of ComEd understood that giving this contract to Law Firm A was important to Public Official A. In 2016, Law Firm A’s contract was up for renewal. As part of renewal discussions, personnel within ComEd sought to reduce the hours of legal work they provided to Law Firm A from the 850 hours specified in the 2011 retention agreement because ComEd paid only for hours worked and there was not enough appropriate legal work to give to Law Firm A to fill 850 annual hours.

Thereafter, an attorney associated with Law Firm A [Lawyer A] complained to Individual A about ComEd’s effort to reduce the amount of work provided to Law Firm A. On or about January 20, 2016, Individual A contacted CEO-1 and wrote, “I am sure you know how valuable [Lawyer A] is to our Friend [Public Official A],” and then went on to write, “I know the drill and so do you. If you do not get involve [sic] and resolve this issue of 850 hours for his law firm per year then he will go to our Friend [Public Official A]. Our Friend [Public Official A] will call me and then I will call you. Is this a drill we must go through?” CEO-1 replied in writing, “Sorry. No one informed me. I am on this.” Thereafter, CEO-1 tasked a ComEd employee, who was assigned as a “project manager” to assist with the project of obtaining legislative approval of FEJA, to ensure that Law Firm A’s contract was renewed. The project manager had no oversight authority over ComEd’s legal department and was not otherwise involved in deciding what legal professionals the legal department retained. The project manager was assigned the task of ensuring Law Firm A’s contract was renewed because the work provided to Law Firm A was, in part, designed to influence and reward Public Official A in connection with Public Official A’s official duties, including the promotion and passage of FEJA. ComEd agreed in or around June 2016 to renew Law Firm A’s contract with substantially reduced annual hours.

* “Internship Program”…

Beginning no later than 2013, and continuing until in or around 2019, ComEd operated an internship program. As part of the program, ComEd would accept a specified target number of students who primarily resided in a Chicago ward that Public Official A was associated with (“Public Official A’s Ward”) and that were recommended to ComEd by associates of Public Official A, including Individual A. ComEd hired students from Public Official A’s Ward, in part, with the intent to influence and reward Public Official A in connection with Public Official A’s official duties.

* “Benefit to ComEd”…

Between in or around 2011 and in or around 2019, during the same time frame that ComEd was making payments to Public Official A’s associates, and extending other benefits for the purpose of influencing and rewarding Public Official A, ComEd was also seeking Public Official A’s support for legislation that was beneficial to ComEd, including EIMA and FEJA, that would ensure a continued favorable rate structure for ComEd. ComEd acknowledges that the reasonably foreseeable anticipated benefits to ComEd of such legislation exceeded $150,000,000.