* Illinois Supreme Court…

JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Garman, Michael J. Burke, and Carter concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Theis and Neville took no part in the decision.

Byron Sigcho-Lopez, the alderman for Chicago’s 25th Ward, filed a complaint with the Illinois State Board of Elections (Board), alleging that his predecessor’s campaign committee, the 25th Ward Regular Democratic Organization (Committee), unlawfully paid personal legal fees from campaign funds. The Board dismissed Sigcho-Lopez’s complaint, and Sigcho-Lopez filed for administrative review in the appellate court. On administrative review, the appellate court affirmed the Board’s dismissal. 2021 IL App (1st) 200561. This court allowed Sigcho- Lopez’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)), and for reasons other than those set forth by the Board and the appellate court, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment and the Board’s dismissal. […]

Until the General Assembly amends the statute to, for example, specifically prohibit payment from campaign funds for legal fees incurred in defense of criminal allegations against a public official or candidate, the issue requires the Board’s consideration on a case-by-case basis, applying the plain language of the applicable statutory provisions. In this case, despite the parties’ arguments regarding legal defense fees incurred as a result of public corruption allegations, the record here reveals that Solis had not been indicted on criminal charges but only that he had worked with federal investigators using his official capacity to expose public corruption. Considering the evidence before the Board, we find that the Board’s conclusion—that Solis’s legal fees amounted to a proper expenditure not prohibited as “satisfaction or repayment” of a personal debt (10 ILCS 5/9-8.10(a)(3) (West 2018)) but incurred “to defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions” (id. § 9-8.10(c))—was not clearly erroneous. Thus, we affirm the Board’s decision, finding that the complaint was not factually and legally justified.

There was no dissent.

…Adding… I was scheduled to appear on Jak Tichenor’s Illinois Lawmakers show earlier, so I didn’t have much of a chance to read through this carefully worded opinion before posting it. The justices focused primarily on what the campaign finance statute forbids. For example…

Whether legal defense fees amount to a personal debt that does not defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

In the case sub judice, the parties ostensibly agree that campaign fund payments expended for personal use are prohibited by the Election Code. Sigcho-Lopez argues that legal fees expended for the criminal defense of public corruption charges amount to personal debt prohibited as a campaign fund expenditure, and the [25th Ward Regular Democratic Organization] argues that legal fees expended for the criminal defense of public corruption charges are not personal in nature because the public corruption charges would not exist irrespective of the public official’s position.

* The justices chose to “apply the plain language of the relevant campaign disclosure and regulation provisions of Illinois’s Election Code”…

In doing so, we reject the Committee’s argument that legal fees incurred as a result of public corruption and criminal activity, resulting in conviction even, may be subsidized by campaign funds because they are not personal debt incurred irrespective of the officeholder’s position. We cannot ignore that a public official’s actions that result, for example, in convictions of official misconduct or corruption are “clearly committed for their own interests.” … The essence of a conviction for official misconduct, conflict of interest, or public corruption is that the public official has attempted “to personally enrich himself or another by an act exceeding his lawful authority as a public servant.” […]

(W)e also reject the contention that, because an officeholder could not engage in public corruption absent his position as officeholder, his personal legal defense fees for proven official misconduct or public corruption may be subsidized by campaign funds as an expenditure “to defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions.”

* The court then noted a New Jersey Supreme Court decision which ruled that using campaign funds to defend against corruption charges was not an ordinary and necessary expense: “A grand jury indictment is not a customary, or usual, or normal incident of holding public office, nor does it occur in the regular course of events,” that court decreed…

This court agrees. Allowing campaign monies to subsidize public corruption amounts to an unreasonable interpretation of the Election Code.

* But…

On the other hand, we also reject Sigcho-Lopez’s contention that legal fees incurred to pay for a public official’s criminal defense against investigations or charges of public corruption amount to a per se prohibited personal debt pursuant to the plain language and spirit of section 9-8.10(a)(3) of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/9-8.10(a)(3) (West 2018). We cannot ignore that not all allegations by political rivals are sound and that baseless allegations are at times asserted against public officials because of their very capacity as public officials. […]

Therefore, in limited circumstances, pursuant to the plain language of the campaign disclosure and regulation provisions of the Election Code, the Board may appropriately allow the use of campaign funds to pay for legal expenses in defending such allegations. See Wright, 174 Ill. 2d at 404 (holding ordinance invalid to the extent it attempted to indemnify officials convicted of crimes for their attorney fees and costs incurred in their unsuccessful criminal defense but making no express determination regarding the authority of any municipality or home rule unit to indemnify its officers and employees for legal expenses incurred in a successful defense); see also State v. Ferguson, 709 N.E.2d 887 (Ohio 1998) (although public officeholder may generally not use campaign funds to pay for legal defense against criminal charges, use of campaign funds to pay attorney fees incurred in connection with dismissed indictment that failed to state prosecutable violation was not prohibited attorney fees).

Clear as mud?

…Adding… Press release…

The following is a statement from Ald. Byron Sigcho-Lopez (25th Ward) in response to today’s Illinois Supreme Court ruling in Byron Sigcho-Lopez v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2022 IL 127253:

“If the law allows corrupt politicians to use campaign funds for legal defense fees, then it’s time to change the law.”

…Adding… Press release…

In response to the Illinois State Supreme Court’s decision today to dismiss cases in which campaign funds are used for criminal defense fees until specific legislation prohibiting the practice is put into law, State Representative Deanne Mazzochi (R-Elmhurst), issued the following statement:

“With this decision, the Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that the General Assembly needs to act immediately. We have seen millions in campaign funds expended by Mike Madigan on his own legal defense for his corruption indictment. Madigan may be the most prominent, but he is certainly not the only politician to selfishly do so. The people of Illinois deserve better.

Officials using their campaign funds for their own defense after they are tangled up in public corruption scandals is yet another example of how insider power and privilege in Illinois protect their own. I filed legislation, HB 2929 because we cannot allow campaign donations to finance corrupt politicians’ efforts to keep themselves out of jail.

Unfortunately for the people of Illinois, like numerous other pieces of legislation filed by myself and my colleagues to tackle out of control corruption in Illinois, Democrats have refused to allow these bills to be heard and voted on. Democrats have stifled every attempt made this spring to restore public trust.”