* From the federal government’s latest filing…

The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, by and through its attorney, Andrew S. Boutros, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, respectfully submits this response in opposition to the post-trial motions filed by defendant Michael J. Madigan (R. 396, 401).

The evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly proved that (i) Madigan solicited and accepted bribes paid by Commonwealth Edison in exchange for Madigan’s official action on legislation, in the form of jobs (including no-show jobs) for Madigan’s allies; and that (ii) Madigan agreed to use his position as Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives to try to get Chicago Alderman Daniel Solis appointed to a paid State board position, in exchange for Solis steering business to Madigan’s private law firm.

Madigan’s motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 ignores the overwhelming evidence presented over 11 weeks of trial and the deferential standard that must be applied. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there was ample evidence to convict Madigan on all charges on which the jury found him guilty. Madigan has failed to meet the nearly insurmountable hurdle he faces in attempting to overturn the jury’s verdict through a judgment of acquittal.

Madigan’s motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 is similarly ill-founded. For the reasons discussed below, the trial record conclusively demonstrates that there were no errors during the trial that jeopardized his substantial rights. […]

Madigan ignores the standard applicable to a Rule 29 motion and presents a cherry-picked version of the evidence presented at trial. The evidence, particularly when considered in the light most favorable to the government, abundantly proved Madigan’s guilt as to the counts of conviction. There is no basis for the Court to take the extraordinary step of overturning the jury’s verdict.

* From Madigan’s March post-trial motion for a new trial…

The Court should grant a new trial “if there is a reasonable possibility that a trial error had a prejudicial effect on the jury’s verdict. The Court has broad discretion in making this determination because it “heard all the evidence, watched both the witnesses and the jury,” and is in the best position to determine whether any improper evidence “tipped the scale against” a defendant. Id. at 438. Additionally, if the Court “believes there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has occurred—that is, that an innocent person has been convicted—[he] has the power to set the verdict aside, even if he does not think that he made any erroneous rulings at the trial.” […]

Madigan is entitled to a new trial because jury instruction and evidentiary errors had a prejudicial effect on the jury’s verdict. In addition to these errors, a new trial is required because the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, as described in the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. […]

Madigan also proposed the following jury instruction, which the Court declined to give:

If the defendant believes in good faith that he is acting within the law or that his actions comply with the law, he cannot be said to have acted corruptly or with the purpose to obtain an unlawful benefit for himself or someone else. This is so even if the defendant’s belief was objectively unreasonable. However, you may consider the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief together with all the other evidence to determine whether the defendant held the belief in good faith. […]

The jury should have been instructed on the accurate mens rea. That is, a defendant acts “corruptly” when he specifically intends to receive a private financial benefit in violation of his legal duty to faithfully represent his constituents and the citizens of Illinois. Instead, the instructions reduced the mens rea to mere “knowledge” requiring only that the defendant understand that an exchange occurred.

“Section 666(a)(1)(B) makes it a crime for state and local officials to ‘corruptly’ accept a payment ‘intending to be influenced or rewarded’ for an official act.” Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1, 10 (2024). The Supreme Court recently explained that that Section 666 requires: (1) “that the official have a corrupt state of mind[;] and [(2)] accept (or agree to accept) the payment intending to be influenced in the official act.”. The Seventh Circuit has also made clear that the requirement of corrupt intent is a key safeguard against criminalizing innocent conduct.

* Back to the feds…

Madigan asks this Court to ignore binding Circuit precedent and impose a heightened mens rea standard under § 666, where none exists.

Before the jury instruction conference, Madigan asked the Court to instruct the jury that “[a] person acts corruptly when that person acts with the knowledge that his conduct is unlawful.” R. 261 at 95. On January 19, 2025, after the Court’s initial ruling on the term “corruptly” (Tr. 8105-19), Madigan shifted positions and offered a new proposed definition of “corruptly,” that a “defendant acts corruptly when he specifically intends to receive a private financial benefit in violation of his legal duty to faithfully represent his constituents and the citizens of Illinois.” R. 317 at 9 (copying Madigan’s email to the Court dated January 19, 2025).

The Court properly declined to give Madigan’s novel proposed definition of “corruptly.” Instead, the Court instructed the jury, largely consistent with the Seventh Circuit Pattern Instructions, but adding the specific requirement of an intended “exchange,” that:

A defendant acts “corruptly” if he acted with the understanding that a ‘thing of value’ is to be exchanged for an “official act” with the intent to influence or reward a State agent in connection with his official duties . . . In other words, the government must prove that when a defendant solicited, demanded, accepted, or agreed to accept, a “thing of value” with the intent to be influenced or rewarded in connection with his official duties, the defendant did so knowing it was a “this for that” exchange of a “thing of value” for an “official action.”

* The federal government’s list of Madigan’s alleged lies…

Although the government’s evidence amply supports the verdict, Madigan’s lies on the witness stand gave the jury additional reason to find that he acted with corrupt intent, (jury may conclude based on false testimony, that the opposite of the false testimony is in fact true). The jury clearly discredited Madigan’s testimony that he never traded official action for private gain and never believed that any company to whom he recommended people intended for him to trade official action. Madigan lied on numerous other occasions:

• Madigan lied when he testified that McClain never said he believed or suspected that any of the people that Madigan and McClain had referred were not working. This testimony was a lie, as demonstrated by a call the jury heard between Madigan and McClain in which they laughed about the fact that multiple people were paid by ComEd for little work.

• Madigan lied about his involvement with Ed Moody’s contract. Specifically, during his direct examination, Madigan was shown Government Exhibit 248, a December 7, 2018, call where McClain asked Madigan: “So do you want us to keep going with Ed Moody under that ComEd agreement or do you want us to pull off a little bit because of this Recorder of Deeds thing?” Madigan told two lies to the jury. First, he claimed that he merely understood McClain to be “asking for some advice.” Id. Second, Madigan claimed that McClain’s request for advice was because Moody now had a full-time government job (as Recorder of Deeds), as opposed to his prior part-time job with the Cook County Board. Id. (“in light of his [Moody’s] assumption of a full-time executive position, that he ought to pull back on his extra work with ComEd”). This testimony was false. As an initial matter, Ed Moody had a full-time job that Madigan helped obtain with the Circuit Court of Cook County from 1993 to 2016, as Madigan acknowledged during cross examination. And Madigan’s claim that McClain was merely asking for “advice” makes no sense. McClain was clearly asking for instruction from Madigan. GX248 (“Do you want us to keep going with Ed Moody” and “Do you want me to call Ed and tell him?”) In both instances, Madigan gave instructions to McClain, demonstrating his knowledge of and control over the subcontractor arrangement.

• On direct examination, Madigan testified that his motivation for recommending people for jobs was to help people who came to the 13th Ward office in need. Madigan testified that he viewed it as part of his job as a legislator and as Speaker to help people, including with jobs. Madigan’s testimony on direct glaringly omitted any mention that in return for finding employment, Madigan expected certain of those individuals to do political work for Madigan. On cross-examination, Madigan was confronted with an interview he gave on this topic in 2009 (GX1) and acknowledged that he used his governmental position to help find jobs for people with the expectation that some of those people would do unpaid political work for Madigan in return. Madigan’s true motivations for finding jobs for his associates demonstrated why Madigan wanted to secure payments for people like Ed Moody and Ray Nice at ComEd and how that work personally benefitted Madigan. Madigan’s attempt to hide his motivation from the jury was an attempt to falsely deny the bribery charges.

• As another example, Madigan acknowledged helping Kathy Laski finding a job during his direct examination and testified that he met her at a block party. Madigan failed to mention during direct that Laski’s husband had been alderman of the 23rd Ward, which was part of Madigan’s legislative district.

• Madigan repeatedly lied when he attempted to minimize his relationship with McClain. As just one example, when asked during cross-examination by McClain’s attorney about the repeated times that Madigan went to McClain for help with problems, Madigan testified that he asked for McClain’s help on “some of them, but not all.” Tr. 8856. Madigan refused to admit that he “regularly” asked McClain to help with problems, stating only that “some” problems were “submitted” to McClain. Id. Madigan’s testimony was in stark contrast to the many emails and calls admitted into evidence that showed Madigan relying on McClain to solve sensitive problems for him (including having McClain talk to legislators who served under Madigan) and make numerous job requests on his behalf.

• Madigan lied when he denied having told Cousineau to round up the final votes necessary to pass FEJA. Tr. 1637-39, with Tr. 8662. Madigan’s denial stood in stark contrast to the evidence, as discussed above, that corroborated Cousineau’s account.

Discuss.