* More background is here if you need it. From a January Tribune story on Snyder v. United States…

In court last month, Scott Lassar, an attorney for ex-ComEd CEO Anne Pramaggiore, said the ComEd Four cases will likely see major upheaval, arguing that jurors were allowed to find her and her co-defendants guilty without evidence of a quid pro quo.

“It is all but certain that there is at least going to be a retrial, if not an acquittal, for the defendants,” Lassar said.

But Assistant U.S. Attorney Amarjeet Bhachu, who is spearheading the Madigan and ComEd prosecutions, suggested defense attorneys were prematurely spiking the football.

“I wish somebody would just read the language of the statute,” Bhachu told U.S. District Judge Harry Leinenweber last week.

In a written motion Friday, Bhachu went even further, calling the effort to delay the sentencings another signal that the defendants are “unrepentant” and trying to shift blame.

* From that written motion…

On the subject of quid pro quo, the defendants have repeatedly said that proof of a quid pro quo is required under § 666. But in doing so, counsel for McClain has described the term quid pro quo as being the equivalent of requiring proof of an agreement between two parties concerning the corrupt exchange of benefits for action, and counsel for Pramaggiore has also suggested that proof of an “agreement” is required.

This is incorrect; this misunderstanding is a result of casual and imprecise use of Latin jargon, namely, the phrase “quid pro quo,” to mask what is really required by the plain English of § 666. While proof of such a meeting of the minds is sufficient to violate the statute, no proof of an “agreement” is required under either prong of § 666. The language of the statute—which defendants ignore—not only punishes those who “agree to accept” and “agree to give,” but also anyone who “solicits” intending to be influenced or rewarded and anyone who “offers” with intent to influence or reward —without regard to whether any mutual understanding is reached with the counterparty.

* From the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Snyder v. United States…

A bribe requires a quid pro quo—an agreement to exchange this for that, to exchange money or something else of value for influence in the future. A gratuity is paid “as a reward for actions the payee has already taken or is already committed to take.” United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183, 1195 (7th Cir. 1997). Snyder insists that the evidence does not support a finding that he and the Buhas agreed to exchange money for the truck contracts before they were awarded. Without a prior quid pro quo agreement, he argues, § 666 cannot apply. […]

Accordingly, we follow here our precedents holding that 18 U.S.C. § 666 applies to gratuities and does not require evidence of a prior quid pro quo agreement.

* From US Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s conclusion in Snyder v. United States…

In sum, §666 tracks §201(b), the bribery provision for federal officials. A state or local official can violate §666 when he accepts an up-front payment for a future official act or agrees to a future reward for a future official act. See United States v. Fernandez, 722 F. 3d 1, 23 (CA1 2013) (the word “reward” “clarifies that a bribe can be promised before, but paid after, the official’s action” (quotation marks omitted)).

But a state or local official does not violate §666 if the official has taken the official act before any reward is agreed to, much less given. Although a gratuity offered and accepted after the official act may be unethical or illegal under other federal, state, or local laws, the gratuity does not violate §666.

* From Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s dissent…

(F)or a payment to constitute a bribe, there must be an up-front agreement to exchange the payment for taking an official action.

Legislatures have also considered it similarly wrongful for government officials to accept gratuities under certain circumstances, but unlike bribes, gratuities do not have a quid pro quo requirement. Generally speaking, rather than an actual agreement to take payment as the impetus for engaging in an official act (a quid pro quo exchange), gratuities “may constitute merely a reward for some future act that the public official will take (and may already have determined to take), or for a past act that he has already taken.”

We took this case to resolve “[w]hether section 666 criminalizes gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions the official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions.” The majority today answers no, when the answer to that question should be an unequivocal yes.

…Adding… Looks that way…

From that story…

Pramaggiore’s attoney, Scott Lassar, said the Supreme Court ruling makes clear that “what Anne Pramaggiore was charged with is not a crime.”

“I don’t think the entire case would be dismissed,” Lassar said. “But we will argue — I think successfully — that all of the convictions have to be reversed. And so, if that’s the case, the government would have to make a choice about whether they want to retry the case.”

Patrick Cotter, McClain’s attorney, said he believes the ruling “does radically change what the U.S. attorney’s office for the Northern District of Illinois can argue is a crime.” […]

Madigan’s lawyers have noted that seven of the 23 counts he faces in his indictment are tied to the law in question.