* Earlier this month we looked at Professor Laurie Reynolds’ thesis about how the Illinois Supreme Court might rule that the Nekrtiz/Cross pension reform was constitutional, even though it appeared to defy the state Constitution’s prohibition against diminishing or impairing benefits. The Tribune editorial page approvingly quoted from her analysis over the weekend and concluded…

The overriding truth here is that all legal speculation is just that. If merely reading statutes, case law and constitutions could settle disputes, we wouldn’t need judges to think more broadly about what’s just. In this dispute, the Illinois Supreme Court could decide that, yes, pensioners are losing some future benefits, but are receiving two gains of great value in return: much healthier pension funds, and a fiscally stable state better able to fund their still-generous benefits.

I don’t disagree that it’s possible the Illinois Supremes could rule this way. With a court, almost anything is possible.

* But there was also this…

As for the 1970 convention: “I have looked at the convention history surrounding the adoption of the pension clause, and it is remarkably scant,” [Professor Reynolds] says. “There was very little delegate discussion of this clause, and I’m not sure how helpful the constitutional history will be to the court’s analysis.”

* I dunno about that. If you click here you can see some pretty extensive Con-Con floor debate, much of it foreshadowing today’s debate.

* Also, according to the analysis prepared by the Senate Democrats’ Eric Madiar, there were at least two attempts to water down the pension language’s impact. Both were rebuffed. The first would’ve tacked some language onto the front of the pension clause itself. The proposed additional language is italicized…

Subject to the authority of the General Assembly to enact reasonable modifications in employee rates of contribution, minimum service requirements and other provisions pertaining to the fiscal soundness of the retirement systems, membership in any pension or retirement system of the state or any local government, or any agency or instrumentality of either, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired

The second attempt would’ve provided some “intent” language read into the record…

The statement provided, in pertinent part, that while the proposed Pension Clause “is taken from the Constitution of New York,” “it should not be interpreted as embodying a Convention intent that it withdraws from the legislature the authority to make reasonable adjustments or modifications in respect to employee and employer rates of contribution, qualifying service and benefit conditions, and other changes designed to assure the financial stability of pension and retirement funds.”

That move was also rejected, leading Madiar to conclude…

The contemporaneous nature of the Commission’s overtures and their rejection by Convention delegates show that the drafters (1) were cognizant of the Clause’s broad limitation on legislative power and (2) intended to immunize pension benefit rights (e.g., employee benefits payments, conditions or contribution rates) from any adverse, unilateral action by General Assembly.

* Voters, of course, had to approve the new Constitution. Madiar looked at the official explanation provided to Illinoisans…

The Convention stated in its official text and explanation of the proposed Constitution that under the Pension Clause “provisions of state and local governmental pension and retirement systems shall not have their benefits reduced.” And, “membership in such systems shall be a valid contractual relationship.”

The Convention’s official explanation also stated that the Clause was a new section “and self-explanatory.” The Convention’s official text and explanation was mailed to each registered voter in Illinois and published in newspapers throughout the State prior to the special referendum election held in December 1970 to approve the proposed Constitution