* Serious COVID flashback vibes…

On Monday, former Republican nominee for Attorney General Tom DeVore and former Illinois State Senator and Republican nominee for governor Darren Bailey filed a lawsuit in White County, challenging Democratic Gov. JB Pritzker’s assault weapons ban, after an Effingham County Judge issued a temporary restraining order late Friday night while the lawsuit proceeds.

The lawsuit raises the same claims as the one filed last week in Effingham County and names Gov. JB Pritzker, State Senate President Don Harmon, D, Illinois House Speaker Christopher Welch, D, and Attorney General Kwame Raoul, D, as defendants.

The lawsuit names over 1,600 plaintiffs, including Bailey; 68 federal firearms dealers and 92 counties, and is based on alleged violations of the Illinois Constitution. One alleged violation is of the Equal Protection Clause, because the Assault Weapons Ban provides exemptions for certain groups – for instance, active and retired law enforcement are exempted from the ban, as well as active military and private security guards.

Retired military, however, much like the general population, are not exempted from the ban. DeVore argues that these exemptions create unconstitutional classes of citizens where legislators have decided who is subject to the ban and who is not.

A hearing is scheduled for this Wednesday at 9:00 am at the White County Courthouse.

The complaint is here.

* Meanwhile, from the appeal filed today by the attorney general’s office of that aforementioned Effingham ruling…

The circuit court’s determination that plaintiffs had a clear right in need of protection and were likely to succeed on the merits was based on an incorrect view of the law. Accordingly, the court necessarily abused its discretion.

First, the court incorrectly held that the Act likely violates the single-subject rule. That rule prevents “the combination of unrelated subjects in one bill to obtain support for the package as a whole, when the separate parts could not succeed on their individual merits.” Kane Cnty. v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186, 214 (1987). It “does not impose an onerous restriction on the legislature’s actions” but “leaves the legislature with wide latitude in determining the content of bills.” Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 515 (1997). Indeed, the legislature must “go very far to cross the line to a violation of the single subject rule.” Id. at 515-16. […]

Rather than examine the provisions of the Act, it looked primarily to the Act’s title and concluded that because the title did not explicitly mention firearms, the Act violated the single-subject rule. SR2010. As support, the court relied on People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89 (2002). But in Boclair, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the circuit court’s approach: the Court explained that “an act’s title is not necessarily dispositive of its content or its relationship to a single subject,” and on this basis “reject[ed]” the “heavy reliance on [the act’s] title to support [the single- subject] claim.” Id. at 109. The circuit court also incorrectly suggested that the Act violates the single-subject rule because it references human and illegal drug trafficking alongside illegal firearms trafficking. SR2010. On the contrary, the trafficking provision relates to the regulation of firearms because all of the crimes identified are frequently perpetrated with firearms. […]

Second, the circuit court wrongly held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the Act violates the three-readings requirement in Article IV, section 8(d) of the Illinois Constitution. But section 8(d) further provides: “The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate shall sign each bill that passes both houses to certify that the procedural requirements for passage have been met.” Ill. Const. art. IV, § 8(d). This is known as the “enrolled bill doctrine”; it “mean[s] that, upon certification by the Speaker and the Senate President, a bill is conclusively presumed to have met all procedural requirements for passage,” including the three-readings requirement.

The Illinois Supreme Court has consistently held that the enrolled bill doctrine precludes litigation challenging certified legislation for failure to comply with the three-readings requirement. E.g., Friends of Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 203 Ill. 2d 312, 328-29 (2003) (collecting cases). The circuit court recognized that the enrolled bill doctrine foreclosed this claim, but declared it was “time to revisit this practice,” and concluded plaintiffs were likely to succeed on this claim based on the Illinois Supreme Court’s decades-old remark that it “‘reserve[d] the right to revisit this issue.’” SR2011 (quoting Geja’s Cafe, 153 Ill. 2d at 260). But while the Illinois Supreme Court reserved its right to revisit this issue, circuit courts cannot declare “precedent a dead letter.” Yakich v. Aulds, 2019 IL 123667, ¶ 13. Because the enrolled bill doctrine unambiguously remains good law, “the [circuit] court committed serious error by not applying it.”

Third, the circuit court’s conclusion that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their procedural due process claim represents another misapplication of the law. A plaintiff may not base a due process claim on the alleged violation of a different constitutional provision. See People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 97; In re A.C., 2016 IL App (1st) 153047, ¶ 60. But that is precisely what plaintiffs are doing here: their due process claim rests entirely on the legislature’s alleged failure to comply with the single-subject and three-readings clauses of the Illinois Constitution.

Furthermore, plaintiffs have failed to identify an individual property interest, which is a necessary element of a procedural due process claim. Vill. of Vernon Hills v. Heelan, 2015 IL 118170, ¶ 31. Plaintiffs have no such interest in the single-subject or three-readings clauses. Not only that, Illinois courts have recognized that the legislative process itself affords any process due. […]

The circuit court recognized these obstacles, yet declined to apply them based on its conclusion that the enrolled bill doctrine should be eliminated. SR2012. But as explained, only the Illinois Supreme Court may overrule its own interpretation of the Illinois Constitution, and the enrolled bill doctrine’s place within it.

There’s lots more. But that appellate court is gonna be a very hostile environment, to say the least.

…Adding… With a hat tip to a commenter, you gotta check this out. It’s like he didn’t prepare for the assignment and was called to the front of the class to explain the topic…