* Sun-Times federal courts reporter…

* From Madigan’s appeal…

Defendant-Appellant Michael Madigan, former Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives, respectfully moves under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 9(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) to stay his October 13, 2025 surrender date and for release pending appeal. It is undisputed that Madigan, who is 83 years old, will not flee and poses no danger and that his appeal is not for delay. The only question, then, is whether Madigan’s appeal will raise “substantial” questions likely to result in reversal or a new trial if decided in his favor. It will.

Few areas of law are as complex and rapidly evolving in defendants’ favor as federal bribery law, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected prosecutors’ aggressive applications of bribery statutes. See Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1 (2024); Percoco v. United States, 598 U.S. 319 (2023); McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010). Madigan’s prosecution involves substantial questions regarding how far these statutes can be stretched—questions this Court has not considered in the wake of these Supreme Court decisions, making this a quintessential case for release pending appeal.

In a sprawling 23-count indictment, the government shoehorned nearly a decade of conduct into alleged corruption schemes. The jury returned a mixed verdict, declining to convict on more than half of the counts. Madigan’s convictions, involving two “schemes,” rest on significant instructional issues and failures of proof that present substantial questions.

First, the government alleged that Madigan conspired to secure work for political associates from a utility company, ComEd, supposedly in connection with official action on legislation of interest to ComEd. The government charged this scheme under 18 U.S.C. § 666, at a time when the statute had been construed to permit prosecution for gratuities, presumably because the government could not prove bribery’s quid pro quo requirement. While this case was pending, the Supreme Court in Snyder limited § 666 to quid pro quo bribery. Instead of dismissing its charges, the government pivoted at trial to a nebulous “stream-of-benefits” theory that disclaimed the need to tie the alleged quids and quos together. The district court facilitated that misguided pivot by declining to instruct the jury that it must find that, at the time of the alleged bribe, Madigan agreed to be influenced on a specific question or matter. Every circuit to consider the stream-of-benefits theory post-McDonnell has found this limitation necessary.

The district court additionally erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the “corruptly” mens rea for § 666 requires consciousness of wrongdoing even though this Court defined “corruptly” that way on remand in Snyder, 2024 WL 4834037, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 20, 2024), and the government accepted that definition below. The district court further erred by instructing that an official acts corruptly if he knows the bribe-giver intends a bribe, contradicting the statute’s requirement that the official himself must intend to be influenced— an error the Second Circuit has expressly recognized. In denying release, the district court declared that the Second Circuit was wrong.

Second, the government claimed that Madigan committed traditional wire fraud and/or honest-services wire fraud by agreeing to recommend a former alderperson for a state board position in exchange for business referrals. But the government failed to prove that Madigan agreed to an exchange or made the recommendation. Nor did it prove that any such recommendation would have included a false statement or would have involved “pressure” or “advice” (and not just “expressing support”) had it occurred. The court also injected instructional error into the fraud counts in response to a jury note.

Finally, for both alleged schemes, the government charged Travel Act violations predicated on state bribery statutes lacking a quid pro quo element. But, as the Ninth Circuit recently held, state bribery statutes lacking a quid pro quo element are invalid Travel Act predicates. The district court below declared that the Ninth Circuit too was wrong.

The district court’s order denying release is manifestly erroneous. Even when the court reached conclusions admittedly at odds with those of other circuits, it refused to acknowledge the substantiality of the questions. Under the court’s standard, no defendant could obtain release pending appeal unless the error arguably violated binding precedent. If that were the test, release would almost never be granted. But in complex fraud and corruption cases like this one, courts routinely grant release. 1 Upon de novo review, this Court should grant release pending appeal and stay Madigan’s surrender date until it decides this motion.